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Abstract
This paper examines the effect of relative geophysical earthquake risk on housing prices
in the Bay Area. The data concludes that the effect of risk on prices is much more
significant today than it was prior to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Evidence also
suggests that the 1994 Northridge quake has played a role in shaping the time trend of the
impact of this risk factor.  Several different scenarios explaining the change in
consumer’s internalization of earthquake risk over time are tested within the model.
Conclusions moderately support a theory in which the psychological effect of large
earthquakes increases the effect of earthquake risk on prices but this impact tends to wear
off over time.2
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1. Introduction:
At 5 PM on October 17,1989 a 7.1 earthquake shook the San Francisco Bay Area.
Damaging over 24,000 structures and killing more than 60 people, this quake was one of
the worst disasters to strike America (Practical Lessons, 1994). It is thus very interesting
to investigate the human response to such a trauma. In economic terms, this response can
be studied through an analysis of the housing market in the Bay Area. According to
economic theory, humans are rational beings capable of incorporating rational thought
into all decisions. However, in the face of such geological damage and risk, will
decisions still be purely rational? Residents of California live with the daily possibility of
massive property damage due to the currently unpredictable phenomenon of earthquakes.
Unlike other threats to home security such as robbery and fire, geology promises that in
regard to a large quake in the Bay Area, it is not a matter of if, but of when. Also, this
type of catastrophe is not selective in its targets as a robber is, but instead affects every
property owner in the area equally according to their respective earthquake risk.
One way to find the answer to this question is to check whether housing prices
reflect this rationality. If so, then prices in areas with more geographical risk should be
lower as consumers are in effect paying a premium to live in safer conditions. The
following study shows that risk does indeed play a significant role in the determination of
housing prices in the Bay Area. Moreover, this effect has increased significantly since the
occurrence of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake.
Further analysis attempts to fit the change in effect of risk over the years since
1989 to one of three stories. In one story Bay Area consumers are completely informed4
and rational in behavior which leads to little or no change in the relative price of risk over
time. A second story assumes stable shifts in behavior in response to the increase in
geological knowledge associated with the incidence of a large quake. The third story
combines the theories of several psychologists and behavioral economists to relate the
severity of risk’s effect on prices with the amount of time that has passed since an
earthquake. In all three scenarios the 1994 Northridge (Los Angeles area) quake presents
itself as an interesting milestone along with the Loma Prieta quake due to its occurrence
within the time period under analysis. Statistical evidence derived from the empirical
results, however, gives little support for the first two theories and only moderate support
for the third. Therefore, several alternate suggestions are discussed in the final section of
the paper.
Overview of Paper Organization:
Section one will begin with a brief description of the seismic history of the Bay
Area and then move into a catalog of previous work done on the subject of housing prices
and earthquake risk. The theory behind this study will be detailed in length in section
two, while section three will discuss the specifics of the empirical model and data
utilized. Finally, section four will document all the empirical results and implications of
the analysis. Also included in section four are alternative explanations for the results and
suggestions for further research on the topic.5
Brief history of Bay Area earthquakes
The 7.1 quake rocking the San Francisco Bay area on October 17, 1989 originated
in the Santa Cruz Mountains in an area known as Loma Prieta. The rupture causing this
massive disturbance occurred along the San Andreas Fault. The San Andreas Fault, the
physical representation of the division between the North American and Pacific plates, is
the longest fault in the world. It runs all the way from Los Angeles to just north of San
Francisco. While scientists do not know the exact movement trends of this fault, research
has shown that the fault will produce a large quake on average every one hundred years.
There is little knowledge on predictions regarding where the quake will occur, however.
Therefore, locations of previous significant quakes as far as scientists are currently aware,
offer little insight into where the next one will occur. This theory suggests that distance
from an active fault is much more telling of a home’s risk than distance from the Loma
Prieta quake.
While the quake in 1989 was quite large, it was no where near the level of that
likely for the San Andreas Fault. San Francisco is no stranger to destruction; the last
catastrophic jolt of the fault in 1906 killed over five hundred people according to record
books. And some experts believe this number reaches into the thousands.
1 The quake of
1906 registered around 8.3 on the Richter scale depending on which source is referenced.
Since the Richter scale is exponential, a quake of magnitude 8.3 is 16 times as powerful
as the 7.1 experienced in 1989. Thus, though Loma Prieta released some stress along the
                                                
1 Army relief operations (Greely, 1906) reported around 600 deaths while further research including that of
Gladys Hansen and Emmet Condon estimates the death count to be over 3,000.6
fault, the threat of a much larger disaster in the future still looms. With this threat clear to
home buyers, it would seem that the more time passes without a quake, the riskier a
purchase would seem as with each passing year a huge quake is increasingly imminent.
2
The government has attempted to increase earthquake awareness in several ways.
In 1974 California released the Alquist-Priolo Special studies Zones Act
3 which required
all real estate agents to inform home buyers of geological risk if the home is situated in a
Special Studies Zone (SSZ). These SSZ include major fault lines and areas within one
eighth of a mile of them and are described as zones of high earthquake risk. Also, the
National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977 helped to foster needed research on
earthquakes, causing the research community to grow. (Practical Lessons, 1994)
Although the government has taken some action to heighten awareness, the threat of
disaster still looms and many people are unaware and unprepared.
Previous work on the subject
Though limited, some research has been conducted regarding the impact of
earthquake risk on housing prices. Palm (1981) investigates the public response to the
Alquist-Priolo Special studies Zones Act of 1974 requiring real estate agents to disclose
all properties within one-eighth mile of an active fault. To retrieve her results Palm used
three tools: a survey to recent home purchasers, a survey to real estate agents asking
                                                
2 Current consensus on earthquake risk suggests that pressure builds in fault zones in the absence of seismic
activity. Thus, unlike an independent binomial probability model, as time passes without an earthquake, the
probability of a seismic event increases.
3 California Public Resources Code, Section 2621.97
about disclosure method, and a hedonic price analysis at the county level. She found that
house price responses to the act were negligible and that the majority of subjects
surveyed did not list earthquake risk as an important factor in their housing decisions.
The fact that the act does not specify a disclosure method leaves much to the real estate
agent’s discretion; Palm considers this fact a possible explanation for her results. In fact,
when surveyed, many respondents did not even know what it meant to be in a Special
Studies Zone (SSZ). Also, she hypothesizes that the perceived threat of an earthquake is
so low that the probability is treated as zero. Being published in 1981, prior to several
major quakes, the theory that perceived threat is zero is less applicable today. Also,
Palm’s hedonic price analysis lacks the credibility of subsequent studies due to limited
controls and a broad level of analysis, namely, the county level. In a more localized
study, Brookshire et al. (1985) received results contradictory to Palm. They discovered,
instead, that the disclosure act of 1974 produced a price gradient for earthquake safety
among houses in California. Comparing results from 1972 housing data and 1978 data
they concluded that the act caused structural change to this gradient. To assess the effect
of earthquake risk on price, Brookshire et al. used a dummy (0.1) measure of risk,
location in a SSZ. Findings revealed that property value differentials for the San
Francisco and Los Angeles area were $2,490 and $4,650 respectively. This study was
conducted in 1985, prior to the 1989 quake, implying that Los Angeles had a higher
perceived earthquake threat than San Francisco pre-Loma Prieta.
More relevant are the studies performed after the 1989 quake. Murdoch et al.
(1993) used real estate transaction data from immediately before and after the Loma
Prieta earthquake to determine that overall housing prices fell approximately 2% as a8
result of the earthquake. They also noted that housing prices in the Bay Area include a
“risk premium” for location areas with less earthquake risk. Thus, prices lie along a risk
gradient where a home outside of a designated fault zone is 3.7% more expensive. Such
analyses are not limited to the Bay Area. Looking at the real estate market in Tehran,
Iran, Willis and Asgary (1997) used an indirect approach to determine willingness to pay
for earthquake resistant structures. Lack of data on housing transactions made a direct
study virtually impossible so real estate agents throughout Tehran were surveyed. The
survey results indicated that residents were willing to pay significantly more for homes
including earthquake resistance than for those without earthquake risk reduction
measures. Interestingly, as opposed to the other studies, this one measured differences in
construction rather than variations in geographical risk. Also, it is one of the few studies
conducted in a developing nation.
Not all papers focused solely upon price changes either. One in particular looked
to determine the change in risk perception as well. As an attempt to assess changes in
subjective risk before and after the Loma Prieta quake, Beron et al. (1997) developed a
simultaneous equations model relating a proxy variable for risk with a hedonic pricing
model. They fit their results to a story indicating that Bay Area consumers initially
overestimated the risk of earthquakes and that the quake itself offered new information
which acted to lower the level of perceived risk. Though somewhat robust, these results
relied upon data from a limited time period. Thus further research on the subject is
warranted.9
2. Theory
The theory behind this thesis relies on trends within the real estate market. An
essential question to be asked then is what determines the price of a house? Of course,
many factors influence housing prices. In general, housing characteristic fall into three
categories: physical, community and geographic. When purchasing a home, one must
consider factors from all three.
According to basic utility theory, the consumer will choose the product which
maximizes personal utility. Utility is derived from each of the housing characteristics.
Knowledge of this utility function allows one to construct a marginal price for each factor
based on willingness to pay.
In this analysis I stick to the assumption that individuals are generally risk averse.
This means that given a choice, one would rather choose a guaranteed payoff rather than
gamble for an uncertain payoff. In the case of earthquake risk and the housing market,
consumers will prefer the house offering more earthquake safety, hence, less risk.
In this case, the factor of interest is relative geophysical earthquake risk. Say a
prospective home owner has a choice between two homes, one of which has low risk of
damage from an earthquake and another with high risk. The high risk home, holding all
other factors equal, will generate a lower house price in equilibrium as the consumer
receives lower expected utility. By looking at the change in willingness to pay for houses
with two different risk levels, holding all else equal, a marginal price for earthquake10
safety can be obtained. My analysis attempts to estimate this marginal price through the
use of a hedonic pricing model which is described in detail in section three.
Assuming consumers always optimize utility, will housing prices necessarily convey
relevant information about the attractiveness of each individual housing characteristic?
Hayek (1945), in his arguments against central planning systems, insists on the ability of
prices to transmit information. Prices, according to his theory are successful due to an
“economy of knowledge.” The beauty of the market system is that when perfect
information is available to all parties, the resulting price of a commodity will accurately
reflect all underlying preferences and information in regards to the product. In the case of
real estate, with perfect information on all housing characteristics, including geophysical
risk, the resulting price will include the information necessary to determine the relative
willingness to pay for each specific characteristic.
As stated above, information is vital to rational economic decision making.
Especially in the case of uncertainty, information is the only avenue through which
consumers can take a course of action to optimize utility. Specifically, in the realm of
information and disaster risk, work has been done to link information to behavioral
response.
Comparing the relative effects of immediate vs. long-term threats of disaster,
Kreps (1984) argues that while people generally take action to protect themselves in the
case of imminent disaster, evidence shows otherwise for long-term threats. According to
his paper, when the perceived probability of an event is low, people become preoccupied
with the issues of daily living. It is only through accurate information that awareness will11
increase. Kreps states that knowledge is positively associated with perceived seriousness
of the threat.(Kreps,1984)
Okrent (1980) emphasizes the importance of information while defining risk and
hazard in a societal context. A major issue in his analysis is the problem of resource
allocation. Institutions have the power to determine how safe is safe enough through the
distribution of these limited resources; no society can be risk free. Okrent stresses that
California has not dedicated enough resources toward seismic safety and that the only
road to increased societal safety is improvement in knowledge acquisition and
distribution
There are two major ways to incorporate risk into decision making. One can either
purchase an insurance plan or self-insure by choosing to pay more for less risky assets
and undertake damage costs independently. The purchase of insurance is expensive,
therefore, the insurance premium must be considered along with the real estate price
when purchasing a home. This extra cost leads to lower willingness to pay for risky
homes. Hence, regardless of the insurance method, prices should reflect the relative level
of risk, and papers analyzing insurance purchase behavior are pertinent to this analysis as
well.
In a more recent study by Palm (1995), surveys were distributed randomly in
1989, 1990, and 1993 to four counties in California, including Santa Clara. The surveys
included questions regarding earthquake insurance adoption and perceived earthquake
threat. Palm found that throughout the time period analyzed insurance purchases
increased steadily, the largest increase occurring in Santa Clara County from 1989 to
1990, a result of the Loma Prieta quake. Also, while the level of perceived risk was12
highly correlated with insurance purchase, the purchase was completely unrelated to
actual geophysical risk. Therefore, the subjects surveyed exhibited perceived risk which
was not correlated to objective, or geological risk
Now, assuming that the relevant earthquake risk information is available to the
average California resident; does this access to information imply that consumers will
always make the rational decision? An important theory of addressing this question is
bounded rationality. Introduced by Herbert Simon (1972), this theory describes how
humans do not have infinite cognitive abilities. They often use mental short-cuts and
rules of thumb leading to sometimes inefficient decision making. Another problem is
memory. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982) have conducted studies showing
that the more recent an event, the easier it is to recall. This theory results in people
generally seeing the probability of a recent event occurring as greater than less recent
events. Relating these findings to the present study, Kahneman and Tversky would be
implying that when an earthquake is recent in people’s minds, they will view the
probability of another quake occurring as higher.
In further research on bounded rationality, John Cunlisk (1996) discussed how
humans have limited statistical understanding. He details many examples of people
failing mental tasks involving statistics. Most of these tasks were relatively simple
compared to many economic decisions. Therefore, there exists a school of thought which
rejects the theory that humans always act rationally.
Interestingly, there exists psychological research related directly to these
behavioral economic theories and the study at hand as well. When studying the effects of
a catastrophic event over time, it is important to take into account psychological13
tendencies in humans. Several experiments, very relevant to my study, examining
behavioral response to earthquakes are detailed below.
Many of these studies emphasize the effect of time on memory and impact of a
disaster. In the first study, Wood et al. (1992), professors from the University of Arizona
and Stanford University jointly conducted an experiment studying the prevalence of
earthquake-related nightmares and the frequency of nightmares in general during the
period following the Loma Prieta earthquake. Results revealed that nightmare frequency
was correlated with the subject’s physical distance from the quake, and that as time wore
on the incidence of nightmares decreased significantly. Also noteworthy, subjects
exhibited emotional reactions regardless of their exposure to physical danger during the
quake. Many psychologists believe that dreams are often reflections of personal concerns
implying that the decrease in nightmares as time wore on may indicate a decrease in
concern about earthquakes. Another experiment by Mulilis et al. (1990) explored the
impact of negative threat appeals (pamphlets warning that a destructive quake will occur
in the near future) on earthquake preparedness and demonstrated that negative threats can
influence earthquake preparation behavior of subjects. However, the effect of this threat
dissipated over time as well.
Finally, Stanford Professors Susan Nolen-Hoeksema and Janney Morrow (1991)
conducted evaluations of depression and anxiety on students 14 days prior to the Loma
Prieta quake and were thus provided with an extraordinary experimental setup for
probing the effect of mood disposition on post traumatic stress. Results enforced previous
psychological theory that ruminative methods are less successful at preventing post
traumatic stress symptoms than are methods involving active distraction. Thus, this study14
implies that it is healthier psychologically for humans to engage in thoughts and activities
which take their mind off of the negative mood associated with earthquakes, rather than
focusing on the daily risk they face. All these studies support Kahneman’s theory of
memory loss.
Three Possibilities
How do these psychological and behavioral economic theories fit in with a study
of housing prices and earthquake risk? They are useful in investigating the perception of
risk and the impact of time. With regards to how perceptions of risk and the effect of risk
have changed throughout the time period studied, there are three different stories which
could be told. In the first story, all prospective home owners have complete information
regarding seismic risk and optimize the consumption problem with the incorporation of
all current available information. The 1989 and 1994 quakes occur, but as each individual
already took into account risk and their knowledge about this risk was complete, there
should be no change in the consumption problem and hence no change in the effect of
risk on housing prices.
Imagine another scenario, before the 1989 quake individuals were aware that
earthquake risk existed and incorporated all available information into their decision
making. However, the quakes of 1989 and 1994 generated new knowledge regarding
earthquake risk causing consumers to shift their preferences after each quake by
assigning a greater marginal penalty to risk. Consumers are still acting completely15
rationally though, and once the shift in effect of risk occurs, it remains constant at that
level until new information is obtained.
The third situation is most relevant to the psychological phenomenon described
above. Numerous studies showed the influence that time has on memory. In this situation,
pre-1989 consumers may consider risk an issue but do not incorporate all available
information into their decision making since the last large quake affecting the Bay Area
was in 1906 and thus not a recent memory. After Loma Prieta, consumers change their
behavior and attribute more price sensitivity to earthquake risk immediately after the
quake. This shift remains constant for a while but begins to wear off as bounded
rationality causes them to think of less of past risks and more of non earthquake related
recent risks. The 1994 quake would again cause a change. This change may either return
prices to the same pattern as post 1989 or may cause risk to be an even more significant
factor, if new information is learned. Again, in the time period from 1994 until today, the
effect or risk, while still being a player in price determination would wear off slightly,
and the overall impact would be lower.
In the following section, data is used to test a model which attempts to determine
the time trend of risk effects in the Bay Area real estate market. Results establish which
story explains the collected data best.16
3. The Empirical Model:
This analysis uses the hedonic pricing model to examine pricing characteristics
within the real estate market. The hedonic pricing model relies upon the theory that
consumers choose to maximize utility through purchases. With regard to housing in
particular, this utility can be derived from characteristics both internal and external to the
house itself. When determining the attractiveness of a house three types of characteristics
are important: physical, community, and geography. The hedonic pricing model allows
one to identify the extent to which aspects of the three characteristics affect price
(amosWEB).
Physical factors include average square footage and median year built.
Neighborhood factors include school rankings, population density, median family
income, and other local variables. Finally, the model also accounts for geographical
characteristics such as availability of water and most importantly relative earthquake
vulnerability.
Use of the hedonic pricing model is generally reasonable for studies such as this
one. For example, in a similar study on the effect of air pollution on residential property
values a hedonic pricing model was used successfully. (Anderson and Crocker, 1971)
Considering the relatively low level of complexity involved in this investigation, I have
assumed that a simple hedonic price model provides a reasonable analytical setup.17
The Data
I designed this study using ZIP codes as an index. Considering the type of data
needed to estimate this hedonic pricing model, ZIP codes offered the most specific level
of data available publicly. Not only does the US Census Bureau have surveys available at
the ZIP code level, the Rand Corporation and the US Geological Services offer the
remaining data at this level as well. The only options for more specific analysis require
the purchase of individual transaction data which is out of the realm of this project.
4 Also,
ZIP codes are a common geographic division when referring to earthquake risk. For
example, the California Earthquake Authority, the leading provider of earthquake
insurance in California determines their premiums based upon ZIP code location. Each
and every California ZIP code is rated in one and only one rating territory (CEA rate
manual).
Overall fifty-four ZIP codes within the Bay Area are included in the data. These
regions come from San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties. The study is
limited to San Francisco and the Peninsula for a few reasons. For one, reviewing a
smaller region limits errors due to unaccounted for regional variation. Secondly, the main
earthquake activity of the included area is related to the San Andreas Fault. Adding the
East Bay to the analysis would increase the complexity of risk determination as regions in
the East Bay are affected strongly by both the San Andreas and the Hayward fault
systems. Hence, only the above mentioned three counties are represented in the data.
                                                
4 I contacted several sources for information on purchasing more detailed data, however, none seemed to be
available.18
The most important variable in this analysis is that used for geophysical risk. It is thus
imperative that the value of this term be described in detail. Earthquake risk can be
broken down into three aspects: distance from fault, probability of quake on nearby
faults, and susceptibility of soil to ground motion produced from a quake. The value I use
is one provided by the US Geological Services (USGS) and is defined by ZIP code,
where each ZIP code is assigned a numeric value. The USGS’s value relates to a measure
referred to as Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA). PGA measures the peak acceleration
reached during an earthquake. During a quake, earth motion generally moves in a
horizontal fashion, this movement causes objects on the surface to accelerate and shift.
The greater the acceleration, the greater the structural damage. Ground acceleration is
directly affected by two of the risk determinants discussed earlier, distance from fault and
soil composition. However, the USGS value is not simply a measure of acceleration. In
order to satisfy all three components of risk, the probability of seismic activity must be
taken into account.  For each given ZIP code, the USGS value indicates the peak ground
acceleration expected to occur with ten percent or greater probability within the next fifty
years. When comparing values between the various ZIP codes, PGA terms for all
combinations of percentage occurrence and time periods have the same relative values,
thus the 10% level in 50 years accurately reflects relative risk. Overall, sixteen levels of
geophysical risk are included in the data set
The following is a map of the ZIP codes of San Francisco County. Darker regions
indicate higher earthquake risk. For example, the green shaded ZIP codes are the least
dangerous of the county.19
Figure 1: Risk of San Francisco County
Figure 2.1: Risk of San Mateo County (northern county)20
Figure 2.2: Risk of San Mateo County (southern county)
Figure 3: Risk of Santa Clara County21
Many different forces can affect the real estate market, thus it is imperative to
introduce controls into the experimental design. As described earlier, this hedonic model
will incorporate data describing many different housing characteristics. This data was
retrieved from a variety of sources. The majority of demographic variables including
population, median family income, and median age of structures for each zip code came
from the US Census Bureau’s Housing and Population Survey of 1990 and 2000. All
observations occurring after 1995 were paired with the 2000 Census Survey data and all
occurring before 1995 were paired with the 1990 Census Survey data.
The Rand Corporation provided much of the remaining data. Monthly median
house sales (in 1997 dollars) and transactions by ZIP code as well as median square
footage and average school rankings all came from Rand Corporation’s database.
However, this monthly real estate data is not completely ideal. Due to administrative
changes, the California Association of Realtors has only provided ZIP code level data
publicly since 1991. Furthermore, from 1991-1994 the only data available was for Santa
Clara County.  I investigated numerous other options attempting to obtain a more
complete data set and concluded that the Rand data was the best option available. The
education data, however, was complete and included the state rank for each school in
each ZIP code.
Table 1 includes basic statistics for all the included variables:22
Table 1: Summary statistics for included variables
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
 
Year 1997.3 2.45 1991 2001
Risk 65.44 12.814 52.652 96.2
Pop 29421.31 16949.1 1556 74513
popdense 10002.98 11200.25 33.31377 54621.94
water
(sqmiles)
0.1419994 0.53044
0 3.5442
mdfaminc 80736.77 33679.54 19143 200001
medyrbuilt 1957.76 12.25 1939 1993
Rank 7.18 2.15 1 10
avgsqft 1422.44 371.292 642 3068
san_mateo 0.4032 0.491 0 1
san_francisco 0.318 0.4662 0 1
santa_clara 0.279 0.449 0 1
medhsprice 399200.9 235455.5 78418.57 2740456
ln(medhsprice) 12.7657 0.5087517 11.2698 14.8236
medhsval90 363903.9 95004.27 162500 500001
medhsval00 579719.5 228670.8 254100 1000001
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4. Empirical Results
Initially, a regression analysis was used to show that the role of risk in consumer
behavior within the real estate market has indeed changed since the 1989 Loma Prieta
Quake.  Using housing data from the 1990 and 2000 Census Survey only, hedonic price
regressions can be compared. As the 1990 survey was distributed and collected early in
the year the assumption is made that not enough time passed after October, 1989 for a
significant number of housing transactions to have occurred after the quake, thus the
reported house values are in line with pre-quake valuations. The two regression analyses
included the following variables for each ZIP code:
Pop: The population in each ZIP code according to the Census Surveys of 1990 and 2000
Medfaminc: Median family income in 1990 and 2000
Medyrbuilt: The Median year built of all homes in each ZIP code in 1990 and 2000
Medsqft: Median square footage of homes within each ZIP code in 1990 and 2000
Rank: The average state rank of schools within the ZIP code.
Risk: The peak ground acceleration variable calculated for each ZIP code.
Also included are dummy variables for the three counties: San Francisco, San Mateo, and
Santa Clara.
5 These dummies should pick up any variation occurring due to laws or
                                                
5 The values associated with the dummy county variables were insignificant so they have not been
reported. However, I still feel it is reasonable to keep them in the regression model as they do pick up some
variation.24
regulations at the county level with relation to the real estate market or earthquake
response or preparation.
The results of these two regressions analyses are consistent with the hypothesis
that earthquake risk plays a larger role in housing sales today than it did before Loma
Prieta.
Table 2:  Regression Analyses of earthquake risk and controls on ln(house
value) for 1990 and 2000 (standard errors in parentheses)
  1990 2000
 
medfaminc 3.47E-06 3.15E-06
  (-2.13E-06) (2.01E-06)
pop -6.01E-07 -5.49E-06
  (2.07E-06) (2.36E-06)*
rank 0.0524424 0.0395611
  (2.09E-02)* (2.30E-02)
medsqft 0.0001976 0.0002336
  (0.000127) (0.0001661)
medyrbuilt -0.0100292 -0.0140884
  (0.0045638)* (0.004441)*
risk -0.0024571 -0.0068856
  (0.0025548) (0.0029009)*
cons 31.80953 40.57997
  (8.934852)* (8.759439)*
 
R
2 0.6394 0.5387
Sample size 54 54
* indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level
Table 2 includes the coefficient and for each variable in the regression (standard
errors appear in parenthesis). As expected, the coefficients on median family income,
school rank, and median square footage are all positive. High family incomes and highly
ranked schools make neighborhoods more desirable, and of course larger homes are more25
desirable as well. Hence, these three variables should have positive marginal prices.  On
the other hand, population and median year built have negative coefficients which are no
surprise either. Highly populated areas are often less desirable and median year built can
be argued to have an inverse effect on price as well. Often towns are originally
constructed in the most desirable location. Later housing development often results in
sprawl which lacks the convenience and desirability of the original town center.
When reviewing risk alone one can see that in the 1990 regression the coefficient
is not significant at any reasonable level. However, in the 2000 regression, the t-statistic
associate with risk jumps in absolute value and indicates that risk is highly significant at
the 1% level. More importantly, the coefficient on risk almost triples in absolute value
from 1990 to 2000. Scanning the table as a whole, the only other statistic that changes as
significantly is the one for population, the rest of the 2000 variable statistics remain
comparable to 1990.
To test the robustness of these results a final regression analysis was run including
a variable for the interaction between the year 2000 and risk. Thus this regression model
appeared as follows:
ln(house value) = â0 + â1medfaminc + â2 pop + â3 rank + â4 medsqft +
â5 medyrbuilt + â6 risk + â7 risk*00 + â8 year_00 + å
The parameter of interest here is the coefficient on the risk*00 term. By controlling for
each year as well as risk separately, this interaction term can then capture the change in
effect of risk from 1990 to 2000. As shown Table 3, the coefficient is negative and with a
t-statistic of -2.36, the difference in effect of earthquake risk on housing price is26
significant at the 5% level. Hence the conclusion can be made that earthquake risk has a
larger influence on the selling price of a home in 2000 than it did before the Loma Prieta
quake of 1989.
Table 3:  Regression analysis of earthquake risk and controls on ln(house
value) including the risk*00 interaction variable (standard errors in
parentheses)
   
 
medfaminc 3.72E-06
  (1.20E-06)*
pop -2.96E-06
  (1.67E-06)
rank 0.0463992
  (1.60E-02)*
medsqft 0.000191
  (0.0000956)*
medyrbuilt -0.0117841
  (0.0028406)*
risk -0.0013568
  (0.002165)
risk*00 -0.0065034
  (0.002878)*
year_00 0.726614
  (0.219222)*
cons 35.27803
  (5.613762)*
 
R
2 0.7184
Sample size 108
* indicates coefficient is significant at the 5% level
The regression analyses above suggest that the effect of risk on prices is more
pronounced after the Loma Prieta earthquake than before. However, the models do not
address the more central question of whether the psychological effect of the quake has27
worn off somewhat, or whether risk is as significant a factor today as it was shortly after
the earthquake occurred.
In what follows I offer some analysis that addresses this question and I also focus
on the effect of the 1994 Northridge quake in altering risk perceptions with regard to Bay
Area housing prices as well. The data used to conduct these more detailed regression
analyses include median housing prices for the years 1991 through 2001. More
comprehensive than the census data on housing values used in the previous analyses,
here, each price used in the hedonic model is created by weighting monthly values with
the number of transactions occurring within the month. Therefore, the final yearly median
house price value used should allow for monthly housing trends as well. As the data set
includes many different years, it is cross-sectional time-series data, otherwise known as
panel data. When using such data certain questions arise. 
For one, when dealing with different panels of data one must consider the
possibility that the variances may not be common among panels. Hence, the regression
used must allow for heteroskedasticity between the panels. The second major question is
whether serial correlation exists within the error terms of the different panels. This
possibility can be accounted for by allowing the estimate to account for the presence of
AR(1) autocorrelation within the panels. The model used for the following analysis
incorporates all the above panel data robustness considerations.
6
                                                
6 I used the xtgls command in Stata which fits panel data models using GLS while at the same
time allows for heteroskedasticity and AR(1) autocorrelation among the data. As these two major concerns
are taken into account through the use of xtgls, it is reasonable to assume that the results are not
compromised due to unaccounted for correlations often resulting through the use of panel data.28
Similarly to the previous regression analysis, I study the effect of time on risk by
creating several risk-time interaction variables. By including the risk variable along with
a variable for each time period which is interacted with risk, I can estimate the change in
the effect of risk on prices between the base year and each interacted year. In this case, I
felt the most appropriate base period would be the years 94-95. The previous regression
models already established that the effect of risk has changed significantly since the 1989
quake, I am now interested in seeing what effect if any occurred due to the Northridge
quake in 1994. Also, this time period is even more interesting since the 7.2 Kobe quake
rocked Japan exactly one year to the day after Northridge on January 17, 1995.
Aside from the interaction terms, the variables used for this model are generally
the same as those used previously. There are, however, a few differences. For one,
instead of population, I found that in this analysis population density is more accurate. I
have also included one extra variable, water, indicating the square mileage of water
within each ZIP code. Water should have a positive coefficient as areas with more water
are commonly more desirable places to live. The results of the GLS regression are in
Table 4:29
Table 4:  Regression of earthquake risk and controls on ln(house price)
including interaction variable for each time period(standard
errors in parentheses)
       
 medfaminc 3.80E-06 year91_93 -0.8982828
  (4.81E-07)*   (-0.7088793)
popdense 5.17E-06 year96 0.0011666
  (1.78E-06)*   (-0.0835141)
rank 0.0101127 year97 0.0952087
  (5.96E-03)**   (-0.0969968)
medsqft 0.0007014 year98 0.2028232
  (0.000032)*   (0.1013405)*
medyrbuilt -0.0105416 year99 0.3295437
  (0.0012123)*   (0.1027192)*
water 0.0241549 year00_01 0.586297
  (0.0150134)**   (0.1003625)*
risk -0.0062388 san_mateo 0.1500306
  (0.0010031)*   (0.0310746)*
risk91_93 0.0002008 santa_clara 0.4369731
  (0.0001216)**   (0.0448994)*
risk96 0.0065065 Cons 31.295437
  (0.0010077)*   (2.396077)*
risk97 0.0061937  
  (0.0011779)*  
risk98 0.0057792  
  (0.0012366)*  
risk99 0.00546  
  (0.0012525)*  
risk00_01 0.0045022  
  (0.0012217)*  
AR(1) correlation 0.3873    
Sample size 376    
* indicates coefficient is significant at the 5% level
** indicates coefficient is only significant at the 10% level30
First, one can see the importance of using this form of regression model, the common
AR(1) correlation value is .3873, definitely high enough to warrant its inclusion.
On a quick glance, as with the previous analyses, the main house and
neighborhood variable coefficients have the expected algebraic signs. Median square
footage, amount of water, school rank, and median family income all have positive signs,
and all are clearly positive attributes to a home and its surrounding neighborhood. It may
seem surprising at first that population density has a positive sign. Although high
population density is often associated with crime and poverty, considering the areas
involved in this study, high population density generally refers to areas in San Francisco,
a highly desirable city in which to live. Again, median year built is negative for the
reasons discussed previously.
Now, reviewing the variable of interest, risk, some interesting patterns emerge.
First, the coefficient of risk alone is strongly negative and statistically significant. Thus,
in the base time period of 1994-1995 risk had a large impact on housing prices. What is
most intriguing is that all but one of the interaction terms are extremely significant. Also,
the only term that is not significant at the 5% level, risk*91_93 is significant at the 10%
level. This suggests that the effect of risk in each of the time periods is statistically
different from what it was in 94_95.
Each interaction term has a positive coefficient implying that risk had its strongest
negative effect of -.0062 in 94_95. Again, the way to interpret these interaction terms is
to think of them as the difference between the base risk value and the risk value in the
year in question. For example, since the interaction coefficient for 91_93 is .0002, the
risk value for these years would be -.0062 + .0002 = -.006, slightly less of an effect than31
the 94_95 value. Doing a similar exercise for each of the interaction terms, a graph
illustrating the trend of risk over these years is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4:
Trends in the effect of risk on price over time
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The upper and lower bounds represent the 95% confidence level intervals.
Thinking back to the three scenarios discussed in section two, story one is clearly
discredited based on this graph because according to the first story no change should be
observed over time. The second scenario of updating information agrees with the drop in
the 94_95 time period, however, the fact that the coefficient does not remain at the lower
level rules it out. It should be noted that the drop in 94_95 did not seem to last long at all.32
These results suggest that psychological forces may be causing consumers to act in a
manner not supported by standard rational choice theory.
Interestingly, in 96, the coefficient on risk is positive. Closer examination also
shows that the year96 variable, contrary to other years has a negligible effect. One
explanation could be that in 96 the previous earthquakes had a region-wide impact and all
housing values dropped, regardless of relative earthquake risk. This phenomenon would
cause the risk factor to be close to zero and would also counteract the usual yearly
increasing trend in the housing values. After 96, risk becomes negative again and the year
variables regain decent sized coefficients as well. Taking all into consideration, it seems
that although story three does not fit the model perfectly either, it offers the closest
explanation. The graph may be indicative of the memory loss scenario introduced by
Kahneman and Tversky. However, the sharp jump in 96 and apparent downward trend
from 96 to 00_01 shed some doubt on this story as well. 
7
Other possible explanations for data findings
There may be other explanations for this trend in data. First, the real estate data
used in this study was not complete. Though I tried to account for this possible bias by
including year dummies and numerous controls, it may be that the lack of data has
                                                
7 Regression analysis using 00_01 as the base year shows that the risk effects from 96 through 99 are not
significantly different than that in 00_01. The only years which differ significantly are 91_93 and 94_95.
Therefore, the downward trend in the graph is not statistically significant.33
influenced the results. Also, by combining 94_95 the hope was to offset the problems of
the 1994 data with the 1995 more complete 1995 set.
Aside from data problems, other explanations could account for these results. It is
interesting to note that other than during the 94_95 time period, risk remains at a
somewhat constant level. One question that is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer is
what is the appropriate level of risk effect? It could be that this level is closer to the point
where risk in the other time periods lie. If this is the case, the psychological effects of
natural disasters such as nightmares, anxiety, and stress may exaggerate the marginal
price of risk to a level below the appropriate value. As the trauma of the quake wears off,
the price returns to the correct level.
Another possibility is that the value used for risk may be highly correlated with
another variable which negatively affects housing prices. Studying the maps with risk
shaded by region, nothing stands out as obviously connecting the risky areas. Thus, I feel
it is reasonable to assume that this is not a likely case.
Finally, for this study to be robust one should take into account changes in
knowledge about earthquake risk. The only information available for this analysis was
the current risk factors, last compiled in 1996. If the USGS published significantly
different figures in the years prior to 1996, the results for those years would be less
relevant. Unfortunately, I was unable to find such information to incorporate it into the
study.34
Conclusion
These regression analyses present an interesting view of human behavior in the
face of a low probability, high-risk event. The data have shown that both the Loma Prieta
quake of 1989 and the Northridge quake of 1994 had significant effects on the
internalization of risk by consumers in the housing market. Both quakes caused the
marginal price of earthquake risk to decrease. There are however, limits to this analysis
warranting further research. A more complete data set including a larger amount of real
estate transaction data and information on specific knowledge about earthquake risk in
each time period could produce a very interesting study. However, considering the data
available, this thesis offers an extremely interesting glance into an area of economics
which has yet to be understood fully.35
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